In this paper I wi l present István Aranyosi's criticism of Roy Sorensen's solution to the 'Yale puzzle' about shadows. According to Aranyosi, Sorensen's ap roach does not work in a new version of the ri dle, the 'Bi kent puzzle' , which means that it is not a proper per ective on shadows. A new ap roach seems necessary and Aranyosi put forward an alternative one, that a lege ly solves both puzzles. In the first two sections I present the two authors' views on shadows and their solution to the Yale puzzle, along with Aranyosi's critique of Sorensen and his solution to the Bi kent ri dle. In the third section I put forward a new ri dle, 'the donut puzzle' , and show that it is fatal to Aranyosi's position. In the last section I fina ly show that Sorensen's lockage theory can easily solve the donut puzzle and can actua ly han le both the Yale and the Bi kent puzzles, contrary to what Aranyosi maintains. The latter's view on shadows, instead, should be rejected.
The Yale puzzle, the Bilkent puzzle and Sorensen's 'blockage theory'
In his "The Nature of Shadows, from Yale to Bi kent" (2010), Aranyosi discusses Sorensen's solution to the so-ca led 'Yale shadow puzzle' , that Sorensen exposed in his famous book Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Sha ows (2008) . The puzzle is presented in the form mentioned by Bas van Fraassen in Laws and Sym etry (1989) According to Sorensen, "the shadow ap ears on the far side by default. Nothing aside from the original lockage of light is needed to place shadow there" (Sorensen, 2008, p. 53) . Therefore it is 'the barn's shadow' , and the flight of the bird has no influence at a l in the situation.
This solution, explains Aranyosi, is in line with Sorensen's general commitment throughout his book to rejecting the counterfactual theory of causation advanced by David Lewis. In the Yale puzzle, "the actual physical process that is responsi le for darkness to be present on the far side of the wa l is the light-locking process due to the intera ion between light and the wa l" (Aranyosi, 2010, p. 220) . What counts in the barn case -and in causation in general -is not what would be the case but the actual physical process -according to Sorensen, at least.
Despite agreeing that 'barn' is the right solution to 'the Yale puzzle, ' Aranyosi is not hap y with Sorensen's ' lockage theory' -which means that Sorensen's theory is the right solution, but for the wrong reason. Swap ing the position of the bird and the wa l, in fact, explains Aranyosi, Sorensen's solution fails.
Imagine a bird flying between the Sun and a high wa l (Sorensen's barn, if you like), so that the poultry casts a shadow on the latter. Ca l S* the dark patch on the ground, aligned with the Sun, the bird and the shadow cast on the wa l. Is S* a part of the shadow of the wa l or is it the shadow of the bird?
The new puzzle is damaging to Sorensen's (Aranyosi, 2010, p. 221). If it is true that, if Sorensen were right, we would have to say that S* is the shadow of the bird, then we would also have to admit that in 'the Bi kent shadow puzzle' (which is how Aranyosi ca ls the new version of 'the Yale puzzle') the bird 'casts two shadows' , one on the wa l and one on the ground (the two of them aligned with the bird and the Sun), which might seem strange -at least if we consider a single light source, as in this case. Worse, as Aranyosi points out, S* could not definitely be cast by (part of) the wa l: "given the actual physical process view of causation that Sorensen champions, since the relevant part of the wa l is already shaded by the bird, [...] it can't be part of the light-locking physical process" (Aranyosi, 2010, p. 221) . Bor owing Sorensen's words, one might say that the shadow directly beneath the wa l cannot be cast by the wa l (by virtue of I). Nor can it be cast by the bird, however (by virtue of II). "But no third thing can cast the shadow. Hence, III is violated" (Sorensen, 2008, p. 53) . This should be enough to refute Sorensen's ' lockage theory' , but Aranyosi a ds another unwanted consequence of it, that a lows him to ca l the new ri dle 'the Bi kent shadow puzzle': again, given Sorensen's view of causation, "we should say that the reason it is dark at 1 a.m. in Yale (New Haven, US), when there is a huge cloud over Bi kent (Ankara, Turkey) at 7 a.m., is that Yale is in the shadow of that cloud" (Aranyosi, 2010, p. 221), which seems clearly wrong.
Aranyosi's 'Material Exstitution View' on shadows
As an alternative to Sorensen's ap roach, Aranyosi defends the Mate ial Exstitution View (MEV), according to which shadows are not 'immateria ly constituted' by parts of the regions they cover. Rather, they are "spatia ly determined [...] by the confi uration of light that delimits the region occupied by them" (Aranyosi, 2010, p. 222) . Accordingly, "proper parts of shadows are not themselves shadows" (2010, p. 223) . Therefore, neither S* counts as shadow nor does S, the dark patch on the ground aligned with the bird and the Sun in the original Yale puzzle. Hence, they cannot violate (1)- (3) and we can keep viewing these principles as plausi le ones.
More importantly, MEV (dis)solves 'the Yale puzzle': both in the case of the bird flying between the barn and the ground and in the case of it flying between the barn and the Sun, the cast shadow is the barn's shadow. In both cases, in fact, the dark region on the ground is the same and the light that delimits and determines it is the one passing around the barn -i.e. the light that is not locked by it. According to this view (that might even be ca led 'non-lockage theory'), it is the barn that casts the shadow on the ground, ir e ective of the bird flying behind or in front of it. The ri dle related to 'the Bi kent puzzle' is of course solved too: it is not the pres-Filosofia Unisinos -Unisinos Journal of Philosophy -19(2):161-166, may/aug 2018 ence of a cloud over Ankara the reason why it is dark in Yale at 1 a.m. It is because at 1 a.m. Yale is standing within the shadow of the Earth, as we learn at school.
Right, but what is a shadow anyway? Sorensen considers it a three-dimensional volume: "the shadow is three-dimensional, for the back side of the object is not receiving light" (2008, p. 143) . According to the author of Seeing Dark Things, we should not focus on the cast shadow, which is just an extremity of the three-dimensional one:
The essential connection between a shadow and its blocker is obscured by our tendency to focus on the cast shadow (the part of the three-dimensional shadow that is intercepted by a surface). [...] As dusty air reveals, the cast shadow is just an edge of a three-dimensional shadow that adheres to its blocker (Sorensen, 2008, p. 92) .
If shadows are three-dimensional volumes, however, how could they be "spatia ly determined [...] by the configuration of light that delimits the region occupied by them" (Aranyosi, 2010, p. 222) ? In order for this to hap en, light should completely sur ound a lightless non-opaque portion of space -with the exception of its leading edge, i.e., the part that is attached to the obtruder. But of course this can only hap en with sma l objects, thanks to the phenomenon of light diffra ion (see Fi ure 1).
In ordinary cases, instead, the situation is the one described in Fi ure 2.
As the Fi ure 2 shows, the ' shadow cone' is actua ly truncated. Its lateral surface is sur ounded by light. But light does not -and cannot -sur ound the whole dark volume. When we consider shadows as three-dimensional entities, MEV is not an ap lica le principle. Accordingly, Aranyosi's solution to the Yale/Bi kent puzzle cannot work either.
Since van Fraassen presented it as a puzzle about cast shadows, however, then perhaps it is not ap ropriate to consider three-dimensional portions of space (volumes), but rather two-dimensional ones (surfaces). As a matter of fact, a cast shadow is "the part of the three-dimensional shadow that is intercepted by a surface" (Sorensen, 2008, p. 92) and in ta ks about the Im ate ial Constitution View (ICV) or the Mate ial Exstitution View (MEV) "the notion of shadow that is relevant [...] is that of a shadow cast on a surface, i.e. a two-dimensional" (Aranyosi, 2007, p. 416) .
In this case MEV works and Aranyosi invokes it for a solution to the Yale puzzle alternative to Sorensen's. As we have seen, according to the author of "The Nature of Shadows, from Yale to Bi kent" , relying on MEV rather than on the ' lockage theory' can provide the same (reasona le) solution even in a new version of the puzzle, that a lege ly hinders the light-locking-process account of shadows. Other situations, however, su gest that MEV might not be such a relia le principle, when it gets to cast shadows.
The donut puzzle
Consider the state of affairs shown in Fi ure 3. Imagine a big opaque ring (a big donut, if you like) standing between an opaque disk and a light source. As the picture shows, were the ring not present, the cast shadow would occupy a sma ler area of the screen. Were the disk not present, instead, the cast shadow would have the shape of a ring. It appears as a dark disk, though. Common sense te ls us that the central area of the cast shadow on the screen is the shadow of the disk, while the rest is the shadow of the ring. According to Aranyosi, however, the dark patch on the screen, aligned with the light source, the hole in the donut and the i luminated part of the disk -that one would proba ly consider as a proper part of the cast shadow (let us ca l it S**) -does not count as a shadow. As we have seen before, in fact, Aranyosi maintains that "proper parts of shadows are not themselves shadows" (2010, p. 223) . This means that the dark disk on the screen is but one single (cast) shadow, as we also learn from Aranyosi's account of the Yale/Bi kent puzzle: "If we adopt the material exstitution view, then neither S, nor S* count as shadows. The only shadow in the Yale puzzle is the one that is sur ounded by the light that has not been locked by the wa l" (2010, p. 222).
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In the situation depicted in the above picture, the configuration of light that delimits (sur ounds) the region occupied by the shadow cast on the screen is clearly the one that has not been locked by the ring. The opaque disk has nothing to do with that. According to MEV, then, it seems we should conclude that it is (only) the ring that casts the shadow on the screen. But of course this cannot be the case -or else the result should be the same cast shadow that one would see were the opaque disk not present.
An advocate of MEV might reply that even admitting that what seems to be a single dark disk on the screen is actua ly the result of two shadows that fit together (the ring's and the opaque disk's), this would not undermine Aranyosi's solution to the Bi kent puzzle, for in the latter case the bird's shadow is ' locked' by the wa l, while in the state of affairs depicted above the opaque disk can cast a shadow directly on the screen. In other words, the situation is not the same. 3 As said before, S* is the dark patch on the ground, aligned with the Sun, the bird and the shadow cast on the wall in the new version of the Yale puzzle (due to Aranyosi) , in which the bird is flying between the Sun and the barn. S, instead, is the dark patch on the ground, aligned with the Sun and the bird in the original version of the Yale puzzle, in which the bird is flying behind the barn and does not receive any light from the Sun. 4 It might be objected that this is exactly part of Aranyosi's criticism of Sorensen's 'blockage theory', therefore it is not correct to attribute a similar view to him. However, Aranyosi does not deny that shadows are the result of an interaction between a light source and an obtruder, of course: "[shadows] are ontologically dependent entities. What they depend upon is what we shall call their source. The source of a shadow is the quantity of light and the object, the obtruder, which stands in its way toward the surface where the shadow is located. There is also a condition on the environment that has to be satisfied, which is a nonzero volume of space, for which it is true that light would have penetrated it, had it not been blocked by the obtruder. The relation between a shadow and its source is causal, the latter causing the former" (2007, p. 417) . There cannot be a shadow without a light source and an obtruder, whichever view on these entities one might advocate.
Of course it is not open to an advocate of MEV to admit that there are two shadows on the screen, because light sur ounds and delimits just one. Otherwise, MEV should be amended to the effect that some shadows can be delimited by other shadows and not just by light. Perhaps this could be done on the condition that ' shadow' is then used as a count noun and not, as su ge ed by van Fraassen, as a mass noun -which is proba ly not in the spirit of MEV. Note that this would not necessarily imply admitting that shadows do have parts, since S* -the dark patch on the ground, aligned with the Sun, the bird and the shadow cast on the wa l in the new version of the Yale puzzle -could be seen as an independent shadow and not as a proper part of the shadow on the ground -which again is possi le only on the condition that ' shadow' is considered a count noun.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, let us assume that an advocate of MEV can admit that shadows do have partsor that two distinct shadows can fit together, one 'inside' the other. Whose shadow is S* then, in the Bi kent puzzle? It cannot be a proper part of the shadow cast by the wa l, "since the relevant part of the wa l is already shaded by the bird" (Aranyosi, 2010, p. 221) . 4 But if S* is not cast by the wa l, then the only other plausi le alternative is that the caster is the bird. What if S* is considered an independent shadow and not a proper part of the shadow on the ground then? We l, this would clearly be tantamount to admitting that it is cast by the bird.
Either admitting that shadows do have parts or that two distinct shadows can fit together, one 'inside' the other, then, this would be damaging to Aranyosi, for in any case he would be forced to conclude that it is the bird that casts shadow S* -which is exactly what he wants to deny.
The only way of concluding that S* is cast by the wa l (insofar as it is ap ropriate to eak in this way, since, according to MEV, S* does not count as shadow) is by maintaining that there is but one single shadow on the ground -in other words, that there is no such thing as shadow S*. This assumption a lows Aranyosi to focus on the light sur ounding the shadow on the ground and conclude that it is the confi uration of light that delimits the region occupied by the shadow what determines it (see Aranyosi, 2010, p. 222) . The consequence is that in both versions of 'the Yale puzzle' he can conclude that the shadow on the ground is cast by the wa l and the bird has no influence at a l, wherever it decides to fly. However, the same ap lies to what we may now ca l 'the donut puzzle' , depicted in the picture above. A supporter of Aranyosi's position would be forced to admit that in the ring case the shadow on the screen is but one, for the rationale is the same as in the Yale puzzle -ir espective of the differences between the two cases. But then, she would also be forced to admit that it is the ring that casts the shadow on the screen, while the opaque disk plays no role at a l -which is clearly wrong.
Nor would an ap eal to Lewis's idea of causation as influence help Aranyosi's cause.
5 Quite the contrary, since this counterfactual theory seems to strengthen the view that in 'the donut puzzle' the shadow is caused exclusively by the ring. Bor owing Aranyosi's words, in fact, it might be said that it is the donut alone that exerts influence on the shadow in this puzzle. Sma l changes in the position or size of the donut wi l generate sma l changes in the confi uration of light sur ounding the shadow. Not so for the opaque disk: sma l changes in the position or size of the disk wi l have no influence whatsoever on the light-darkness confi uration on the screen.
In conclusion, MEV can solve (or rather dissolve) 'the Yale puzzle' in its two versions, but clashes against 'the donut puzzle' . Something is wrong with it, then -at least when it comes to solving shadow-related ri dles.
Conclusion: Defending Sorensen's blockage theory
Intuition te ls us that it is the wa l that casts the shadow on the ground in both the Yale and the Bi kent puzzles. According to Aranyosi, Sorensen' s lockage theory could explain why this is the case in the first ri dle, but fails to do it in the second one; in the Bi kent puzzle, instead, an advocate of the lockage theory is forced to admit that S*, the dark patch on the ground aligned with the Sun and the bird, is cast by the latter.
Since this is a result contrary to common sense, that even Sorensen would proba ly disap rove, Aranyosi concludes that the lockage theory should be rejected and puts forward an alternative ap roach to shadows, which he ca ls Mate ial Exstitution View (MEV). MEV gives an ap arently plausi le explanation of why the shadow on the ground is cast by the wa l in both puzzles, but leads to a paradoxical conclusion in another ri dle, 'the donut puzzle' , that I have proposed in this paper. This being so, MEV ap ears to be a mere a hoc solution for the Yale puzzle in its two versions and not an account of shadows that can work in general.
In the donut puzzle, Sorensen's lockage theory leads to a very natural conclusion, instead: the central part of the dark patch on the screen (S**) is the shadow cast by the i luminated portion of the opaque disk, while the rest is shadow cast by the ring. Now, considering that it scores so we l in the original Yale puzzle too, why not pondering a bit more on the Bi kent version of the ri dle, in order to see whether we can reconsider Aranyosi's conclusion that Sorensen's ap roach is wrong?
If, from our star's viewpoint, a bird flies behind a barn in a sunny day, the lockage theory gives a clear and simple explanation of why the whole dark patch on the ground is the barn's (cast) shadow: it is the granary that locks the light rays, and the bird has nothing to do with that. But if the poultry decides to fly in front of the barn, it then intercepts part of the light and casts a shadow on the wa l. How could this portion of the wa l cast a shadow on the ground, now that it does not intercept light anymore, asks Aranyosi? It cannot. Therefore, if one sticks to the lockage theory, one must conclude that part of the dark patch is the bird's shadow. Or reject Sorensen's ap roach and adopt another view on shadows, which is what Aranyosi does.
Note, however, that when the bird flies in front of the barn, the dark patch on the ground is already there. The flight of the poultry does not change the situation, nor can any difference be perceived in the shadow on the ground. In fact, the presence of the latter is due to the presence of the barn. More importantly, it is the barn the responsi le for the original lockage of light. Again, "nothing aside from the original lockage of light is needed to place shadow there" (Sorensen, 2008, p. 53) . That is why the flight of a bird in front of the granary is ir elevant. An advocate of Sorensen's ap roach can then maintain that the cast shadow is the barn's shadow, even in Aranyosi's new version of the puzzle.
Moreover, since Sorensen defines himself as a 'nonstickler' , he would proba ly a d that the bird's lockage of light in the Bi kent puzzle is not of the sort that makes a difference to the scene; if the poultry were absent, the scene would look the same (see Sorensen, 2008, p. 64) . Sorensen can very we l conclude that the shadow on the ground is cast by the barn, then, even sticking to his lockage theory. The same rationale ap lies to the cloud over Bi kent, of course. The cloud has no influence whatsoever on the darkness in Yale at 1 a.m. As said before, the reason why it is dark at Yale at that time of the day is that the city is standing within the shadow of the Earth, be it cloudy in Turkey or not.
In sum, it seems that Sorensen's lockage theory about shadows scores better than Aranyosi's 'Material Exstitution View' (MEV), even when we ignore that shadows are actua ly three-dimensional portions of space and focus only on bi-dimensional cast ones. Three puzzles have been analyzed in this paper: the lockage theory can solve a l of them, while MEV cannot. The new (banal) ri dle put forward in section three is fatal to MEV, which should then be rejected, pace Aranyosi.
